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Managing uncertainty in creative industries: film sequels and Hollywood's 
profitability, 1988-2015 
John Sedgwick, Michael Pokorny and Peter Miskell 
 
Abstract 
The film industry is characterised by high levels of uncertainty, yet the firms that 
dominate global film distribution have remained remarkably stable over the last 
century. The ability to transform uncertainty into risk, and to manage these risks 
effectively, has arguably been the outstanding achievement of major American film 
studios since the 1920s. This article examines how the risk management strategies of 
these firms have evolved over time, with a particular focus on the growing prevalence 
of sequels during the last 30 years. We analyse data on the box-office earnings and 
budgets of over 4000 films released between 1988 and 2015, and find that sequels 
have become an increasingly important source of industry profits since c.2000. We 
place this trend in historical context, and argue that while sequels themselves are not 
new, their role within film portfolios has changed, and that this represents a 
distinctive approach to risk management within the industry. 
 
Keywords: creative industries; film industry; sequels; uncertainty; risk management. 
 
1 Introduction 
Film, like other sectors of the creative economy, is often described as being characterised by 
uncertainty of demand (Caves, 2000; De Vany, 2004). While large numbers of new products 
are launched into the market each year, the popularity of these films is highly uneven, with a 
few hit productions typically dominating box-office takings. Yet neither producers nor 
consumers can reliably predict which films will become each season’s hits (De Vany and 
Walls, 1996). It is an industry, in screenwriter William Goldman’s well-worn phrase, in 
which ‘nobody knows anything’ (Goldman, 1984: 39). To understand how firms can operate a 
sustainable business model under such circumstances it is useful to draw on the distinction, 
first made by Chicago economist Frank Knight in the 1920s, between ‘risk’, which is 
measurable and therefore manageable, and ‘uncertainty’, which is inherently unpredictable 
and not subject to measurement (Knight, 1921; 2012). A key challenge for the major film 
studios has been to convert the uncertainty of film production into a set of risks that can be 
managed. Since the 1920s they have achieved this by constructing annual portfolios of films, 
the objective of which is not so much to maximise the returns on each film in the portfolio but 
rather maximise the returns on the portfolio as a whole, with the clear expectation that many 
films, if not the majority, will generate losses.  Such film portfolios will typically exhibit high 
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levels of diversification, in terms of film budgets, genres, stars, directors, screenwriters, and 
so on.  It is via this diversification process that some control can be exercised over the 
uncertainty of film production, in much the same way that a traditional investment portfolio is 
constructed with a view to managing risk.  A more detailed discussion of these ideas can be 
found in Sedgwick and Pokorny (1998) and Pokorny and Sedgwick (2010). 
However, the recent history of Hollywood seems to have confounded this account of film risk 
and uncertainty. In recent decades the annual lists of top grossing films have hardly been an 
eclectic (and unpredictable) mix of movies drawn from different sections of diversified film 
portfolios, but instead have been dominated by established movie franchises. While film 
sequels have by no means removed uncertainty from film production, their prevalence would 
suggest that they have come to be seen as a more reliable source of revenue (and profit) than 
other releases. Perhaps there are people in the industry who do know something after all?  
Alongside the literature on uncertainty in the creative industries have been attempts to 
identify the characteristics of popular media content. A key idea here is the need for films 
(like other cultural products) to balance the simultaneous demand for the familiar and the 
novel. While consumers seek novelty, ‘they also want novelty to be accessible and familiar’ 
(Lampel, Lant and Shamsie, 2000: 266). The paradox, as Derek Thompson puts it, is that 
‘people crave new products, ideas and stories, provided they are just like the products, ideas 
and stories they already know’ (Thompson, 2017: 284). The task facing content creators in 
this context is not to keep generating an infinite variety of media product on the assumption 
that some (unknown) proportion of them will become spectacularly successful, but rather to 
carefully design content that is ‘optimally new’ and which therefore has a stronger likelihood 
of success. 
In this paper we explore the extent to which film sequels and franchises have become the film 
industry’s preferred method of generating ‘optimally new’ content, and whether the 
construction of multi-part film franchises is coming to replace the diversified film portfolio as 
the key mechanism by which risk is managed. We do this through a detailed analysis of films 
released between 1998 and 2015, and by locating this analysis within a wider historical 
context. 
2. The context 
A portfolio approach to film production rests on two types of knowledge - the ex-ante premise 
that some films lose money; and the ex-post identification of which films these are. During 
the studio era of film production, when big budget films regularly made losses, this dilemma 
was resolved by studios making sufficient number of middle and low budget films to absorb 
the losses incurred through big budget production (Sedgwick and Pokorny, 1998; Pokorny 
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and Sedgwick, 2010). Accordingly, although studios could not be labelled risk loving, 
accepting losses was an integral aspect of studio production - they certainly were not averse to 
the prospect of making losses with individual pictures.  
This portfolio strategy of spreading risk was based upon the constantly high level of demand 
for films per se, with cinema audiences peaking in 1946 (US Department of Commerce).  It 
was not that big budget films were not popular. They mostly were. It is rather that they were 
not always sufficiently popular to cover their costs of production and distribution. Or to put it 
differently, the extent of the market including foreign sales was not sufficient to support them 
as lone entities but was sufficient to allow middle budget films to make profits on a consistent 
basis.  
The post-war period saw the studio system metamorphose into one in which studios no longer 
made all of the films they distributed; rarely took a full risk exposure on the films they 
invested in; and, finally, no longer owned and managed cinema chains. During the years 1946 
to 1965, box-office declined in value by two-thirds, with consumers now largely attracted en 
masse to big budget productions. As a consequence, film revenues becoming increasingly 
unequally distributed, with Gini-coefficient values rising markedly over the period 
(Sedgwick, 2002; Pokorny and Sedgwick, 2010). These changes brought about by the decline 
in audience numbers, required the studios to amend their strategic thinking. No longer could 
they rely on middle-budget film revenues to cover the losses of big budget production. 
Indeed, it was film consumers who could be labelled as loss averse in that they were 
increasingly prepared only to go to the cinema to watch films that were highly likely to please 
them – a cinema of attractions, as opposed to a cinema of habit. They had become more 
discriminating. Habitual consumption of relatively low budget entertainment shifted from the 
big screen to the small. 
If the sharp decline in cinema attendances posed a major strategic threat to the industry in the 
1950s and 1960s, from the 1970s onwards film distributors were able to derive new revenue 
streams from ancillary markets. The emergence of film distribution through video (and later 
DVD) or via cable TV, pay-per-view or terrestrial television served as a complement to, 
rather than a substitute for, theatrical revenues. As each new release channel became 
established, it added to the overall market size, such that by the mid-2000s a typical film 
earned only around 20% of revenues from theatrical (cinema) release (Waterman, 2005). The 
expansion of these post-theatrical release channels has meant that big budget films are now 
much more likely to be able to cover their costs (albeit over a slightly longer time frame) and 
thus a strategy of concentrating film production on a smaller number of high profile films has 
become more viable. It is important to note here that not all films stand to benefit equally 
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from the revenue opportunities opened up by these markets. Theatrical release continues to 
perform the vital function of revealing audience preferences for individual films, with the 
movies that are hits with cinema audiences also dominating market shares in subsequent 
release windows. For producers and distributors the task of creating a hit movie may not have 
become any easier, but the life cycle (and thus the earning capacity) of such films has been 
extended. 
Under these conditions it is not difficult to understand why the focus of the industry may have 
tilted increasingly towards what March (1991) calls the exploitation of successful filmic 
properties, at the expense of exploration or experimentation in identifying new content within 
diversified portfolios. Sequels can be seen as a classic expression of product exploitation, and 
in the marketing literature they have been interpreted as brand extensions, extending the 
success of the parent film and reducing the risks of film production (Hennig-Thurau et al, 
2009).  The literature is consistent on the box office and profit enhancing impact of sequels 
(Basuroy and Chatterjee, 2008, Hennig-Thurau et al, 2007, Walls, 2009, Terry et al, 2009, 
Terry et al, 2010).  However, given the general trend of sequels generating lower returns than 
parent films and previous sequels, the implication is that sequels tend to generate lower 
satisfaction levels amongst consumers.  Hence, there are implications for the manner in which 
sequels need to be marketed and promoted (Moon et al, 2010, Sood and Drèze, 2006).  
The proliferation of sequels can be dated from the turn of this century. It is a new 
phenomenon in movie history, in that while batches of like-films can be identified during 
earlier periods, these were rarely the most high profile, big budget releases, but were more 
likely to be the kinds of mid-budget productions which the industry saw as a relatively 
reliable source of profit. Examples from the 1930s and 1940s include the Andy Hardy films, 
the Thin Man series, and the run of Tarzan films – all of which were released by MGM, 
though the Tarzan franchise was taken on by RKO in the early 1940s (Glancy, 1992; Jewell, 
1994).  Perhaps an exception from the studio-era is the famous set of nine musicals starring 
Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers released between 1933 and 1939, which while not strictly 
sequels in that they did not share the same narrative lineage nor characterisation, they had in 
common a particular musical style and gender relationship between the two leading stars. 
Whilst initially highly profitable and popular, these films, in keeping with the literature 
referenced above, ultimately succumbed to a life-cycle process of rising costs and falling 
revenues and most interestingly, for our purposes, did not lead to copy-cat behaviour on the 
part of rival studios. Not until the James Bond films made by Eon Productions for United 
Artists in the 1960s do we see the emergence of a big budget film franchise of the type that is 
now common, but this remained atypical within the industry for several decades. By way of 
contrast, the rise in the number of sequels from 2000 onwards was evident across several 
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major studios and associated strongly with their increased profitability, in which the usual 
risk-return investment relationship became inverted. 
The growing prominence of sequels among each season’s major film releases has been an on-
going source of comment in the trade press. A Variety article from 2006 presented the 
apparent puzzle concisely: 
Hollywood is well aware of the perils of the franchise biz: spiralling production, talent and 
marketing costs; thumbs-down reviews from jaded critics and bloggers who like to grouse that 
Hollywood has no original ideas; and the nagging concern that a character arc will be 
stretched so thin it will sabotage a popular library title. Despite these fears, the studios are 
producing a staggering number of sequels (McNary, 2006). 
A decade later, the same questions were still being posed: 
Hollywood’s reliance on franchises has increased dramatically in the last 15 years. But box 
office data highlights the risk associated with pursuing endless sequels: a majority of 
franchises head downhill after the first movie (Dawson, 2016).  
Our paper addresses this puzzle in a number of ways. First, it focuses on film profitability, not 
just box office revenue, as the key measure of film performance. Second, it compares the 
profitability of sequels not to that of their ‘parent’ films, but to the wider body of original 
movies released alongside them. This is important as films which spawn sequels tend to be 
only the most successful hits, and are thus atypical. It is perfectly conceivable that even if 
sequels show declining profitability over time, they are still much more profitable than the 
average film release. Finally, our analysis focuses on individual distributors, allowing 
comparisons to be drawn between the investment strategies of different firms, rather than 
treating Hollywood as a homogeneous entity. 
3 The Dataset 
Altogether, 13,646 films were released in North America (that is, US and Canada – 
hereinafter referred to as the US market) between 1988 and 2015. The focus of this article 
will be the financial performance of 4,622 films produced by the ‘major’ Hollywood 
studios/distributors. Table 1 lists the studios from which these films emanated.  
Insert table 1 about here 
These films represent 33.9% of all 13,646 films generating US box-office over the period 
1988 to 2015, generating 91.5% of US box-office over the period. Thus, we will assume 
hereinafter that the performance of the majors, as defined above, provides an accurate 
barometer of the performance of the whole (North American) market, given the extent to 
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which these majors dominate the market. The data is supplied by Nielsen EDI/Rentrak, which 
serves the entertainment industry with performance metrics.1 
For those films for which production budget estimates are available, estimates of film profits 
can be derived, and in particular, estimates of profits generated from theatrical release in the 
US.  In order to estimate profits generated in North America, from theatrical release, it is first 
necessary to estimate the worldwide BO generated by a given film.  This then allows for the 
estimation of the proportion of box-office revenue generated in North America, and hence the 
estimation of the proportion of film production costs attributable to North American release.  
The dataset does not contain data on overseas box-office revenues, although it does contain 
data on UK box-office for those films released onto the UK market.  There are two websites 
that contain data on overseas box-office – boxofficemojo.com and worldwideboxoffice.com. 
These websites produced data on overseas box-office for 78.2% of the 4,622 major films.  
However, coverage over the data period was variable.  In particular, data were available for 
97.6% of the films released from 2000 onwards, but only for 56.2% of the films released prior 
to 2000. Thus, the problem occurs for the films released over the earlier period, and we 
therefore estimated overseas box-office for those films for which data was unavailable.  
The approach taken was as follows:  Of the 2,171 films released prior to 2000, 537 of these 
films were not released in the UK and no overseas box-office data were available on these 
films from boxofficemojo and worldwideboxoffice.  Hence it was assumed that these films 
generated zero overseas box-office. Therefore, of the 1220 films for which overseas box-
office data were available, 1220˗537=683 films had data on overseas box-office.  However, of 
these 683 films 39 did not receive a UK release – that is, these films generated overseas box-
office (from boxofficemojo or worldwideboxoffice) but were not released in the UK.  That 
left 644 films for which data were available on both US and UK box-office and overseas box-
office.   A regression was therefore run on Real overseas box-office on real US and UK box-
office (all measured in US dollars) in order to generate an equation that could be used to 
estimate overseas revenues on the basis of the US and UK revenues generated by a given 
film.  The resulting equation generated a 𝑅2 value of 0.828 (with real UK box-office raised to 
the power of 1.5 to resolve a non-linearity problem in the original regression).  This equation 
was then used to estimate real overseas box-office for those major films for which data were 
available on both US and UK films but not on overseas box-office. 
The next issue is the proportion of total film revenues that can be attributed to theatrical 
release.  Our starting point is data presented in Vogel (2015), Table 4.6 (p. 110).  This shows 
                                                             
1 Nielsen EDI was sold to Rentrak in 2010. 
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the proportion of film revenues attributable to theatrical release, in 5 year intervals, from 1985 
to 2005, with an additional observation for 2007.  The trend was a broadly declining one, and 
annual estimates of this proportion were generated by fitting a straight line to the data in 
Table 4.6 and interpolating this proportion for each year from 1988 to 2007. The result is the 
assumption that the proportion of total film revenues attributable to theatrical release declined 
from 0.43 in 1988 to 0.21 in 2007.  However, it would now appear that a trend has begun to 
emerge of home entertainment expenditures moving away from film viewing to newer forms 
of home entertainment such as Netflix (Wallerstein, 2016), implying that the proportion of 
film revenues attributable to theatrical release has increased since 2007. Using data supplied 
by Nash Information Services LLC on film revenues derived from domestic and international 
video results in the assumption that the proportion of film revenues attributable to theatrical 
release increases from 0.21 in 2008 to 0.25 in 2015. 
Next, we require the proportion of box-office revenues that revert back to the 
studios/distributors in the form of film rentals.  Such estimates are provided by Vogel (2015, 
Table 4.3, p 100).  These proportions, while exhibiting a small degree of year to year 
variation, are relatively stable, and we have used the annual average of 0.416 to translate box-
office revenues into film revenues. 
The final issue in deriving estimates of film profits and film rates of return is a methodology 
for estimating film distribution costs.  The approach we adopt follows the approach developed 
in the appendix to Pokorny and Sedgwick (2010).  That is, we assume that a film’s 
distribution costs are related directly to the film’s production budget and the subsequent film 
rentals that are generated.  That is, we have, for film i: 
 𝐷𝑖 = 𝛼𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑖        (1) 
where 𝐷𝑖 is the US distribution cost of film i,  𝐶𝑖 is the production cost of film i, attributable 
to US release, and 𝑅𝑖 are the film rentals derived from US release.  The issue, then, is the 
derivation of values for the parameters, α and β.  The methodology for deriving these 
estimates is discussed in detail in the appendix to Pokorny and Sedgwick (2010), resulting in 
a value for α of 0.07 and of β of 0.40. 
Thus, in summary, the profits attributable to theatrical release in the US generated by film i, 
𝑃𝑖, are derived as: 
 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖 − (𝐶𝑖 +𝐷𝑖)       (2) 
And hence the rate of return of film i, 𝑅𝑜𝑅𝑖, is derived as: 
 𝑅𝑜𝑅𝑖 =
𝑅𝑖−(𝐶𝑖+𝐷𝑖)
(𝐶𝑖+𝐷𝑖)
       (3) 
8 
 
 
In summary, these estimates are obtained by first deriving data on overseas box-office 
income, thereby allowing film costs to be allocated as between domestic and overseas release.  
Domestic rental incomes were then estimated from the domestic box-office data, itself 
moderated by the knowledge that rental incomes deriving from theatrical release were a 
declining proportion of total rental incomes, given the growth in ancillary markets over the 
28-year data period.  This allows costs to be allocated between theatrical and non-theatrical 
exhibition.  Estimates were also made of film distribution costs.  All data were deflated to 
2005 prices using the US Consumer Price Index.  Given these US profit estimates, film rates 
of return can then be derived as the ratio of the profits derived from US theatrical release to 
total film costs attributable to US theatrical release. 
4 Some Broad Trends in the Film Market 
Figure 1 presents a scatter diagram of the profits generated by these films from US theatrical 
exhibition against the production budgets of these films, all in 2005 prices.  The titles of a 
number of these films are also shown and captures the essentials of the of the risk 
environment of film production.  High budgets cannot guarantee high profits, but rather 
generate an environment in which profitability is highly variable.  A further aspect of Figure 1 
is that the high budget/high profit films would appear to be dominated by films produced in 
the latter half of the data period, with a high proportion of these being sequels. 
Insert figure 1 about here 
In order to examine the time trends in profitability, annual aggregate rates of return can be 
derived.  That is, for any year the annual rate of return to theatrical exhibition in the US can 
be derived as the sum of the US profits across all films released in that year, expressed as a 
percentage of total costs (the sum of production and distribution costs attributable to US 
theatrical exhibition).  However, given the relatively limited coverage of production cost 
estimates in the dataset, the focus will be just on the annual profitability of the major 
studios/distributors.   
Finally, the films of the majors for which budget estimates are available (and hence 
profitability estimates can be derived) account for 27.3% of the films distributed over the 
period (ranging from 54.1% in 1990 to 14.9% in 2014), and 85.8% of box-office (ranging 
from 96.0% in 2001 to 71.9% in 2009). 
Insert figure 2 about here 
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Figure 2 shows these annual rates of return, together with the percentage of profitable films 
each year, from which the clear feature is the strong profitability performance from 2000 
onwards, where annual rates of return trend upwards, commensurate with an increasing 
proportion of film outputs that were profitable.  Indeed, from 2009 over 80% of the films 
released by the majors were profitable.  This performance is in contrast to the performance in 
the late 1980s and the 1990s, when annual rates of return were relatively low, volatile, with 
only around a half of film outputs achieved profitability.  It is the nature of the performance 
prior to 2000 that would generally be interpreted as characterising the financial and risk 
environment of the film industry, and why the performance post-2000 can be seen, 
historically, to represent such a clear break with the past. 
During the period under investigation, the total number of films released onto the North 
American market increased from 322 in 1988 to 707 in 2015, an increase of 120%.  By 
contrast the number of films released by the majors declined by 23%, from 165 films in 1988 
to 127 films in 2015.  That is, by 2015 the majors accounted for just 18% of film releases, 
declining from 51% in 1988. Yet, as has been shown the average the proportion of box-office 
accounted for by the majors was virtually unchanged over the period, averaging over 90%.  
The explanation for this is that average real North American box-office revenues rise during 
this period from $36.2m to $73.5m.   
Insert figure 3 about here 
These changes have occurred within an environment in which a declining proportion of film 
income is derived from theatrical exhibition, from about 43% in 1988 to just 25% in 20152, 
and in which the contribution of foreign markets has increased from 45% of worldwide 
theatrical revenues generated by the majors in 1988 to 61% in 2015.  Indeed, as Figure 3 
illustrates, the strong growth in overseas box-office has more than compensated for the 
decline and stagnation of domestic box-office since the turn of the century. It is this consistent 
domination of the domestic market and the increasing presence in overseas markets that forms 
the starting point for explaining the profitability performance of the majors, as reflected in 
Figure 2.   
Over the period, the majors have increased the average real budgets of their films by 150%, 
from $20.1m in 1988 to $50.3m in 2015 (2005 prices). Of course, a strategy of simply 
increasing real production budgets, of itself, is no guarantee of improved profitability 
performance.  Indeed average production budgets increased consistently during the 1990s and 
yet, as is clear from Figure 2, profitability performance during this period was volatile.  It 
                                                             
2 See Appendix and Vogel (2015). 
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would appear that, at least in the second half of the data period, the more focused approach to 
film production, resulting from the production of fewer but more highly budgeted films, 
generated impressive profitability performance.  The issue, then, is what specific strategies 
were employed that appeared to have so markedly reduced the risk associated with film 
production? 
Insert figure 4 about here 
In discussing Figure 1, one strategy that was alluded to was the apparent growing reliance on 
sequels.  Figure 4 shows the proportions of annual production budgets that were allocated to 
the production of sequels together with the proportions of annual profits that were accounted 
for by sequels.  Thus, in the first half of the data period there was an overall decline in the 
investment in sequels, from a high of 20.9% of budgets in 1990 to just 7.6% in 1999.  
Investment grew strongly thereafter, and by the end of the data period sequels accounted for 
over a third of production budgets.  However, it is the profitability performance of sequels 
throughout the entire period that is the most noteworthy, with sequels contributing a higher 
proportion to profits than the proportion of budgets that they absorbed in all but four years 
(1993, 1996, 1998 and 2014).3  In the last year of the data period – 2015 – sequels accounted 
for over 50% of the profits of the majors.  Equivalently, sequels generated higher rates of 
return each year than the rates of return of all other films, apart from these four years.  Over 
the whole data period sequels absorbed 20.3% of budgets and accounted for 30.4% of profits, 
these percentages being 10.5 and 20.6 in the first half of the data period and 25.9 and 35.1 in 
the second half.  Indeed, when comparing the average (real) production budgets of sequels 
with the average budgets of all other films, the average budgets of sequels have increased 
four-fold whereas the average budgets of all other films have increased at about half of this 
rate. 
The production of remakes is a further strategy that Hollywood has used in an attempt to 
exploit past successes.  However, the aggregate performance of remakes has been far less 
important to overall profitability than that of sequels.  Remakes have consistently accounted 
for less than about 10% of production budgets over the entire period, also generating a similar 
                                                             
3 The somewhat more volatile investment and profitability performance of sequels during the 1990s is 
consistent with the findings of Ravid (1999).  While Ravid only examined sequel production as a 
peripheral issue, and only covered the period 1991 to 1993, the conclusion was that during this period 
sequel production did not appear to be a potentially important and viable film production strategy. 
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proportion of aggregate profits.  At best, remakes can be interpreted as a fairly reliable, but 
relatively unimportant, source of profits.4 
A final strategy that can be considered as reflecting a relatively conservative approach to film 
production relates to the production of films rated as G, PG or PG13.  Such films accounted 
for 80% of film budgets in the last five years of the data period, whereas they accounted for 
just 50% of budgets over the first five years of the period.  The profit contribution of these 
films generally equalled or exceeded that of their budgetary allocation, although in the last 
five years of the data period the profit contribution fell just short of the budgetary allocation 
(77% of profits from 80% of budgets).  In aggregate these films absorbed 70.1% of 
production budgets over the whole period and accounted for 76.4% of profits, these %ages 
being 57.4% and 70.5%for 1988 to 2001, and 77.3% and 79.1% for 2002 to 2015.  G, PG, 
PG13 rated films have always tended to be the major source of Hollywood profits, which is 
confirmed by the current dataset, and we can simply conclude here that the studios have 
continued to expand their investment in such films, although resulting in only a relatively 
marginal increase in their profit contribution.  Of course many of these films will also have 
been sequels. 
 
5 The Profitability Performance of Distributors 
The aggregate analyses of contemporary Hollywood presented in Figures 1 to 4 suffer from 
an ‘illusion of aggregation’, in the sense that they are derived from aggregating across the 
distributors, whereas the specific investment decisions are taken at the level of the firm. 
Consequently it is misleading to evaluate the outcomes of these investment decisions without 
examining their impact on the individual distributors.  We will here therefore explore these 
film investment decisions at the distributor level. 
We begin by presenting a summary of profitability performance of the 10 largest of the major 
producers (by US box-office market share), shown in Table 2.  In general, annual rate of 
return performance for each of the majors was relatively volatile, and so we have ‘smoothed’ 
the data by dividing the 28-year data period into seven 4-year sub-periods.  Table 2 also 
shows the average production budgets (in 2005 prices) in each of the 7 data periods. 
Insert table 2 about here 
                                                             
4 Bohnenkamp et al (2015) draw a similar conclusion, arguing that remakes perform little better than 
equivalent non-remakes, although it would appear that remakes are somewhat less risky than other 
forms of film production, but otherwise offer little in the form of any strategic advantages. 
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The first row of the table presents summary data across all the major studios/distributors.  
Thus rate of return performance improves over the data period (apart from the slight dip in 
performance from 1992-1995 to 1996-1999, consistent with the somewhat more volatile rate 
of return performance in the first half of the data period compared to the second, as reflected 
in Figure 2).  Average real production budgets increase steadily over the period.  In terms of 
the individual studios, MGM stands out clearly as the poorest performer.  Rate of return 
performance of MGM films is highly volatile, even allowing for the smoothing effect of the 
4-year sub-periods, with losses generated over the first two sub-periods.  Overall, their rate of 
return performance is substantially lower than market performance, as are average film 
budgets - from 2011, MGM’s films have been distributed by Sony, and are here included 
under Sony’s outputs from this date.  By contrast, Lionsgate, a new entrant and a similarly 
low budget producer, experiences broadly increasing rate of return performance over the data 
period, notwithstanding the losses generated in its first data period of 1996-1999.  New Line, 
again a relatively low budget producer, exhibits strong rate of return performance, and in 
aggregate matches market performance, although its rate of return performance is relatively 
volatile. (New Line was absorbed into Warner Bros. from 2008).  The last of the ‘small’ 
producers – Miramax – was the lowest budget producer of all the majors.  Although 
generating losses in the first two data periods, it matched market performance in the following 
two periods before declining in the last two periods. (Although Miramax was sold to Disney 
in 1993, it operated independently of Disney, until the founding partners – Bob and Harvey 
Weinstein – left the company in 2005).  
The remaining six majors in Table 2 are all large producers.  Aggregate average budgets are 
broadly similar, although Disney expanded its average budgets markedly towards the end of 
the data period.  Aggregate rate of return performance are comparable across the producers, 
with Twentieth Century Fox and Disney exhibiting superior performance and Warner Bros. 
the poorest performance. 
As suggested earlier in the paper, a more formal and detailed approach to examining studio 
performance is to examine annual performance, rather than the four-year periods in Table 2, 
and to interpret the annual film outputs of a given film studio as analogous to an investment 
portfolio, where the assets in this portfolio are each of the films, with this portfolio diversified 
across a range of dimensions, such as film budget, genre, director, actors, etc. The objective 
then is to maximise the rate of return on the portfolio, with the diversification process a means 
of controlling the risk on the portfolio.  Thus, for each of the distributors the annual rate of 
return on its portfolio can be calculated as the ratio of the total profits generated by the 
portfolio to the total costs of film production - the sum of production and distribution costs.   
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Given distributor annual rate of return performance, it is of interest to determine the manner 
in which this performance responds to overall market performance – that is, to distinguish 
between the extent to which the annual variation in rate of return performance can be 
explained by general market conditions and the extent to which it can be interpreted as being 
specific to each distributor.  Such an approach can be interpreted as being analogous to the 
single index models from the finance/portfolio theory literature. 
A summary of distributor performance can then be derived by regressing each distributor’s 
annual portfolio rate of return on the market rate of return, as shown in Figure 2 above 
(although here we will define the market rate of return as the aggregate rate of return of all 
major distributors excluding each given distributor, in turn).  These regressions, then, 
Specifically, we have for distributor i:  
 𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (1) 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the rate of return on distributor i’s film portfolio in year t, 𝛼𝑖 is the constant term 
– the average annual rate of return generated by distributor i, independent of market 
movements, 𝛽𝑖 measures the extent to which distributor i’s rate of return responds to the 
market rate of return, 𝑟𝑚𝑡, (the annual rate of return generated by all the films released by the 
major distributors, excluding distributor i) and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the residual term. 
There are three statistics that are generated by the estimation of Equation (1) that are of 
interest – the estimated values of 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 (and their statistical significance) and the value of 
𝑅2.  Table 3 produces these estimates for each of the main distributors.5 
Insert table 3 about here 
We begin with an interpretation of the estimated constant terms.  In the case of both Lionsgate 
and MGM these constants are negative and highly significant.  The implication is that both of 
these distributors achieve poorer aggregate performance than the remainder of the majors.  
The positive and highly significant constant term for Disney implies superior aggregate 
performance, which is also the case for both Paramount and Twentieth Century Fox.  In terms 
of the slope coefficients – the β terms – these are all insignificantly different from 1, apart 
from Lionsgate and New Line.  The implication is that the trend performances of these 
distributors are comparable to that of the market.  In the case of Lionsgate the relatively large 
                                                             
5 These regression equations were tested for non-linearities using Ramsey’s RESET test.  Evidence of 
non-linearity was identified in the cases only of Lionsgate and Paramount, but in order to allow the 
direct interpretation of the coefficients in these equations and to compare the results across the 
distributors these regressions were left in their linear form. 
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coefficient – it is significantly greater than 1 – implies that Lionsgate’s performance improves 
over the data period, in comparison to market performance, and reflects the fact that 
Lionsgate exhibits very poor performance in the early years of its data period, but improves 
markedly thereafter.  In the case of New Line its performance is unrelated to market 
performance, and reflects highly variable year-to-year performance in comparison to the 
remainder of the market. 
The 𝑅2 values are all of the order of 0.5, implying that market movements explain about a 
half of annual rate of return variation across the major distributors, the remaining variation 
being specific to each distributor.  The two exceptions to this generalisation are New Line and 
Miramax, in both cases generating very low 𝑅2 values.  These low values derive from the fact 
that annual rate of return performance for these two distributors varied markedly more than 
market performance, implying that market movements had little impact on annual rate of 
return performance, the annual variation in rates of return for these distributors being 
essentially specific to the distributors.   
Insert table 4 about here 
We can next examine the role that sequels played in annual rate of return performance for 
each of the distributors.  Table 4 shows, for each distributor, the percentage of production 
budgets and profits accounted for by sequels, for each of the seven 4-year sub-periods shown 
in Table 2, together with the rates of return generated by sequels and the rates of return 
generated by all other film outputs – non-sequel films.  The first row of the table presents 
aggregate data across all the majors. The data are clear with regard to the importance that 
sequels have played in aggregate – apart from a slight decline in the investment in sequels in 
the mid to late 1990s, investment has increased over the period, accounting for nearly a third 
of production budgets in the last data period.  The profit contribution of sequels exceeded the 
proportion of budgets allocated to sequels in all data periods, with a steady increase in rate of 
return performance over the period, and sequels outperformed non-sequel films in all periods.  
However, at the individual distributor level a much more variable picture emerges.  In the 
case of the larger distributors, Paramount, Twentieth Century Fox and Warner Bros. were the 
market leaders in sequels investment, with more modest investment levels undertaken by 
Sony, Universal and in particular Disney.  In terms of the smaller distributors Miramax stands 
out as a very modest investor in sequels, with Lionsgate and New Line investing substantially 
in sequels (although in the case of Lionsgate this is attributable to very high investment in the 
last data period), with MGM more or less matching aggregate market investment.  
With regard to the profitability of sequels, in general this reflects market profitability, 
although with markedly more variability at the distributor level.  Thus in the case of the larger 
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distributors, the profit contribution of sequels exceeded the proportion of budgets absorbed by 
sequels in all data periods, apart from the late 1990s in the case of Paramount and Sony, Sony 
and Disney (marginally) in the late 2000s, and Universal in the early 1990s, where sequels 
generated losses.  The aggregate rates of return of sequels in the case of the larger distributors 
were broadly similar, ranging from 62.3% (Sony) to 76.8% (Disney).  In the case of the 
smaller distributors performance was far more mixed.  Aggregate rate of return performance 
ranged from 46.3% (MGM) to 86.1% (Lionsgate).  MGM exhibits volatile performance, with 
sequels accounting for 152.9% of aggregate profits, reflecting the fact that much of MGM’s 
non-sequel output generated losses over the period (the negative percentage contribution of 
sequels to profits in both 1988-1991 and 1992-1995 is reflection not of sequels making losses 
in these periods, but rather that total output generated losses, and hence the positive 
contribution made by sequels appears as a negative percentage).  Miramax also exhibits 
volatile sequels performance, but this is presumably a function of only limited investment in 
sequels and hence the ‘hit’ and ‘miss’ nature of the process from period to period. 
Finally, we can consider a more fully specified model of distributor rate of return 
performance, at the level of the individual film.  Thus, a range of factors can be identified that 
might impact upon film rate of return performance.  These would include real film budget, 
film quality, the success of the film in overseas markets, and promotional activity at the point 
of film release.  Given the secular trend in film financial performance that appears to be 
present in Figure 2 a film’s year of release might also impact on financial performance.  It is 
within such a framework, then, that the relative performance of sequels can be evaluated (for 
a comparable approach see, for example, Heath, et al, 2015). 
Insert table 5 about here 
The resulting film rate of return regressions, across all major distributors, and for each of the 
individual distributors, are shown in Table 5.  Note that in the case of film budget the natural 
logarithm is used in order to resolve non-linearity in the original regression.  In the case of 
film budget, the argument here is that higher budgeted films tend to generate lower rates of 
return, cet par.   As is implicit from Figure 1, higher budget films certainly do not necessarily 
generate higher profits than lower budget films, and indeed many higher budget films only 
generate relatively modest profits and hence lower rates of return.   
The measure used for film quality here is the consumer film ratings available on the Internet 
Movie Database website (IMDb).  Success in overseas markets is measured by the proportion 
of film revenues generated in overseas (non-North American) markets.  Promotional activity 
at film release is measured by the number of cinemas in which the film was shown on its 
opening weekend.  The secular trend in film rates of return is measured simply by the film’s 
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year of release.  Finally, the impact of sequels is measured by a simple binary variable, with 1 
denoting that a film is a sequel and 0 otherwise. 
The results of the regressions confirm in all cases the negative impact that film budgets have 
on film rate of return, the positive impact of quality (IMDb Rating), and of both overseas 
revenues and initial promotional activity (Opening Theatres).  In the case of any secular 
impact on film rates of return, this would appear to be largely absent, except in the case of 
Sony where a modest positive impact is in evidence, and Warner Bros. where a weak and 
negative impact is suggested.  Thus, the apparent secular increase in film financial 
performance reflected in Figure 2 would appear to be more likely the result of the marked 
improvement in film performance in overseas markets over time (Figure 3) than any secular 
effect per se.  The final variable, then, is the sequels dummy variable. In aggregate (the ‘All 
Majors’ regression) this variable is strongly and positively significant, consistent with the 
results in Table 4.  Similar effects are in evidence in the cases of Lionsgate, MGM, New Line, 
Disney and Warner Bros., with a weaker effect in the case of Paramount.  However, in the 
cases of Miramax, Sony, Twentieth Century Fox and Universal sequels would not appear to 
outperform other film outputs. 
 
6 Discussion 
From the data presented in this paper, it is apparent that big budget production is no longer as 
prone to loss-making as was the case during the heyday of the studios. Consistent with the 
temporal pattern of film profitability identified in Figure 2, films found in the north-east 
quadrant of Figure 1 were more likely to have been released after 2000, than earlier. From 
this year onwards Figure 2 shows that an increasing proportion of films released by the 
studios became profitable, reaching two-thirds of the sample population by 2015. During the 
same years studio rates of return on film investments rose steadily to reach remarkable levels. 
Compared to the state of the film industry in 1965, the difference is dramatic. Reflected in our 
methods, the major cost accounting changes that takes place between these two junctures is 
the attribution of production and distribution costs to alternative consumer platforms. First, 
the willingness of the TV Networks in the United States to screen film releases of recent 
vintages on prime time weekend slots from the late 1960s for significant rents, followed a 
decade or so later by the introduction and rapid diffusion of new home-based film 
consumption technologies, contributed significantly to the turn-around in the fortunes of the 
film industry. During the period of this investigation only 20 to 25% of revenues accrued to 
the theatrical release sector (see Appendix). 
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Tables 1 and 2 investigate the differential performance of individual studios during the 28-
year period. Not surprisingly, some studios outperform the studio average consistently, while 
others are not so consistent and, or, do not perform as well. The impact of sequels on 
corporate performance is assessed in Table 4, the outcome of which is that many of the 
consistent high performers identified in Tables 1 and 2 also pursue successful sequel 
strategies. Furthermore, it is clear from Table 4 that the production of sequels enhances studio 
profitability and may thus be considered, given the reduced annual production of films and 
their rising budgets, as a strategy devised to narrow consumer risk by reducing the element of 
unexpected surprise. We interpret this as evidence of a partial shift away from broad, 
diversified production portfolios as the principal mechanism for managing risk within the 
industry, towards the construction of a more narrowly conceived set of pictures intended to 
achieve what Thompson (2017) refers to as ‘optimally new’ content. 
However, when these issues are examined at the individual distributor level, a more nuanced 
picture emerges.  From the regressions in Table 5, sequels production in the case of Miramax, 
Sony, Twentieth Century Fox and Universal did not generate significantly superior financial 
performance.  In the case of Miramax this presumably results from the relatively low level of 
investment in sequels, and hence the limitations on risk diversification across the sequels 
produced.  In the cases of Sony and Universal the financial performance of sequels is 
relatively volatile.  In these four cases, once account is taken of the range of factors that might 
impact on film financial performance, the production of sequels did not generate significantly 
superior performance. Nevertheless, industry-wide, the consistent financial success that 
accompanied the release of sequels was sufficient to bring about rising investment in sequel 
acquisition (Table 4). 
Table 5 draws attention to those factors determining the rates of profitability over the period. 
Confirming, previous research identified earlier in the paper, negative coefficient values 
associated with production budgets suggests that sequels were subject to a life cycle process, 
in which the relative profitability of films in sequel lineages declined over time. However, 
when Table 5 is read in conjunction with Figure 3, the negative budgetary effect is more than 
compensated for by the growth in foreign markets, particularly from 2000 onwards. This 
access to foreign markets required films that were universal in appeal, leading the studios to 
acquire intellectual properties that had both sequel potential and cross-cultural attributes. It is 
noticeable that some of the most successful franchises in our data period (such as the Lord of 
the Rings, Harry Potter, and to a lesser extent the movies associated with the Marvel 
cinematic universe) were based on stories and characters already well known to international 
audiences and which featured leading stars from outside the United States. These are 
productions which score highly on the international orientation index which Miskell (2016) 
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showed to be strongly associated with a film’s propensity to attract international audiences in 
the studio era. 
We can also speculate with regard to the implications that this might have for pricing 
strategies.  Traditionally, in an era when film success was much less predictable, and film 
portfolios much more diversified, admission prices had to be kept low to encourage wide 
consumption across the portfolio, allowing the hit films to emerge via a process akin to 
experimentation.  In the current environment in which film releases are treated as ‘events’, 
and film producers are confident of the success of each of their releases, there are clear 
opportunities for engaging in price discrimination – to charge higher admission prices for 
more popular films.  In the past such a pricing strategy would have been considered counter-
productive, for two reasons.  First, because it would discourage wide consumption across film 
portfolios, and encourage much more targeted and strategic film consumption decisions, and 
second, because discriminatory pricing would send out unintended quality signals, implying 
that lower priced films are of lower quality.  A further consequence of such a strategy is that 
high price films would raise consumer expectations concerning the film consumption 
experience, consequently reducing the difference between expected and actual experience, 
thereby increasing the incidence of disappointment.  None of these justifications for uniform 
pricing has the force that it once had, and we could speculate that we might increasingly 
observe price discrimination at the point of theatrical release, where distributors and 
exhibitors can behave as profit rather than revenue maximisers.  Indeed, the fact that theatre 
admissions have been declining since 2002, and real admission prices increasing would be 
consistent with such a strategy.  Declining theatre admissions are no doubt in part a function 
of film consumption occurring increasingly in ancillary markets but may also be a reflection 
of more strategic and targeted film consumption decisions.  This would then allow exhibitors 
to increase admission prices, and particularly so for the high demand films. 
7 Conclusion 
The notion that Hollywood has become increasingly reliant on sequels as a source of profits is 
neither unexpected nor original. However, it is notable. Attention is drawn to the historical 
specificity of this phenomenon: whereas big budget films during the 1930s and 40s were loss 
leaders, with studio profitability dependent upon annual portfolio of releases, today it is 
largely derived from big budget event movies, and in particular lineages of film sequels. The 
grounds for these claims are based upon a quantitative analysis of major studio production 
over the 28 year period, 1988 to 2015.  
One interpretation of these findings would be that the major distributors have adopted 
increasingly risk-averse release strategies, while at the same time benefiting from a market 
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environment that has seen the reach of films expand, both in international markets and 
through the availability of non-theatrical platforms, leading to improved profitability 
performance.  For audiences this has meant an environment in which choice is restricted, and 
the unanticipated, ‘surprising’ film experience less likely to occur.   
An alternative interpretation would be that, faced with movie audiences that have become 
more selective in their viewing and therefore much less likely to sample from a broad range 
of films on a weekly basis, the strategy of constructing broad and diversified film portfolios 
has become less effective as a risk management strategy. It is no longer the case that a large 
volume of (typically profitable) mid-budget pictures can offset the potential losses of big-
budget releases whose popularity is more uncertain. While the overall size of the market for 
filmed entertainment has continued to grow since the 1980s, this growth has been predicated 
on an ability to extend the life cycle of individual pictures beyond their initial theatrical 
release. The most successful (big budget) films are the prime beneficiaries of this market 
growth. Distributors have therefore reduced the breadth of their film portfolios, and 
concentrated their marketing efforts on a narrower range of films that stand the best chance of 
winning audience approval, by combining elements of novelty within familiar and well 
established subject matter. While some studios have proved more successful than others in 
this process, our evidence suggests that all have increasingly come to rely on sequels as a 
means of generating content that is ‘optimally new.’  
  
20 
 
References 
Basuroy, S. and Chatterjee, S., (2008) ‘Fast and frequent: Investigating box office revenues of 
motion picture sequels’,  Journal of Business  Research, 61, pp 798-803. 
Bohnenkamp, B, Knapp, A-K, Hennig-Thurau, T, and Schauerte, R (2015) ‘When does it 
make sense to do it again? An empirical investigation of contingency factors of movie 
remakes’ Journal of Cultural Economics, 39, pp 15-41 
Caves, R. E., (2000) Creative Industries: Contracts Between Art and Commerce, Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Dawson, J. (2016) ‘Franchises: a losing bet’, Variety, June 7, p. 20. 
De Vany, A., (2004) Hollywood Economics: How Extreme Uncertainty Shapes the Film 
Industry, London: Routledge. 
De Vany, A., and Walls, W., ‘Bose-Einstein Dynamics and Adaptive Contracting in the 
Motion Picture Industry’, Economic Journal 106 (1996) pp.1493-1514 
Glancy, H. M. (1992), ‘MGM film grosses, 1924-1948: the Eddie Mannix Ledger’, Historical 
Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 12, 2, pp. 127-144. 
Goldman, W., (1984) Adventures in the Screen Trade: A Personal View of Hollywood and 
Screenwriting, New York: Warner Books. 
Heath, Timothy B., Subimal Chatterjee, Suman Basuroy, Thorsten Hennig-Thurau and Bruno 
Kocher (2015) ‘Innovation Sequences over Iterated Offerings: A Relative Innovation, 
Comfort, and Stimulation Framework of Consumer Responses’ Journal of Marketing, 79, pp. 
71-93 
Hennig-Thurau T., Houston, M.B. and Walsh, G. (2007) ‘Determinants of Motion Picture 
Box Office and Profitability: An Interrelationship Approach’ Review of Managerial 
Science, 1(1), p.65-9 
Hennig-Thurau ,T, Houston, M.B. and Heitjans, T. (2009), ‘Conceptualizing and 
Measuring the Monetary Value of Brand Extensions: The Case of Motion Pictures’, 
Journal of Marketing, 73, pp.167-183. 
Jewell, R. (1994) ‘RKO film grosses, 1929-1951: the C. J. Tevlin Ledger’, Historical Journal 
of Film, Radio and Television, 14, 1, pp. 37-49. 
Knight, F. (2012, first published 1921) Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Newburyport: Dover 
Publications. 
Lampel, J., Lant, T. and Shamsie, J. (2000) ‘Balancing Act: Learning from Organizing 
Practices in Cultural Industries’ Organization Science, 11, 3, pp. 263-69. 
March, J. G. (1991) ‘Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning’, Organization 
21 
 
Science, 2, 1, pp. 71-87. 
McNary, D. (2006) ‘Hollywood serial bowl’, Variety, June 5-11, p. 8. 
Miskell, P. (2016) ‘International films and international markets: the globalisation of 
Hollywood entertainment, c. 1921-1951’, Media History, 22, 2, pp. 174-200. 
Moon S., Bergey P.K. and Iacobucci, D. (2010) ‘Dynamic Effects Among Movie Ratings, 
Movie Revenues, and Viewer Satisfaction’ Journal of Marketing, 74, pp. 108-121 
Pokorny, M. and Sedgwick, J.  (2010) ‘Profitability trends in Hollywood, 1929 to 1999: 
somebody must know something’ Economic History Review, Vol. 63, pp 56-84 
Ravid, S.A. (1999) ‘Information, Blockbusters and Stars: A Study of the Film Industry’ 
Journal of Business 72, pp 463–492 
Sedgwick, J., ‘Product Differentiation at the Movies: Hollywood, 1946-65’, Journal of 
Economic History’, 62 (2002) pp. 676-704 
Sedgwick, J. and Pokorny, M., (1998) ‘The risk environment of film-making: Warner Bros. in 
the inter-war period’ Explorations in Economic History, 35, pp. 196–220. 
Sood, S. and Drèze, X. (2006) ‘Brand Extensions of Experiential Goods: Movie Sequel 
Evaluations’ Journal of Consumer Research, 33, pp. 352-360. 
Terry, N., De’Armond, D. and Zachary, M. (2009) ‘The determinants of opening weekend 
box office revenue for movies’ Journal of Academy of Business and Economics, 9, pp. 193-
201. 
Terry, N., Cooley, J.W. and Zachary, M. (2010) ‘The Determinants of Foreign Box Office 
Revenue for English Language Movies’ Journal of International Business and Cultural 
Studies.  Vol. 2(1), pp. 117-127. 
Thompson, D. (2017) Hit Makers: How Things Become Popular, London: Allen Lane. 
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, (1975) Historical Statistics of the US: 
Colonial Times to 1970, Washington DC 
Vogel, H., (2015) Entertainment industry economics (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 9th edn.). 
Wallenstein, Andrew (2016) ‘Why 2015 Home Entertainment Figures Should Worry 
Studios.’ Variety, January 6 (http://variety.com/2016/digital/news/home-entertainment-
spending-2015-studios-1201673329/) 
22 
 
Walls, W. D. (2005) ‘Modelling movie success when “nobody knows anything”: conditional 
stable distribution analysis of film returns’ Journal of Cultural Economics, 29, pp. 177–90. 
Walls, W. D. (2009) ‘Screen wars, star wars, and sequels: Nonparametric reanalysis of movie 
profitability’, Empirical Economics, 37(2):447-461. 
Waterman, D. (2005) Hollywood’s Road to Riches, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press.  
 
